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Abstract
Ukraine is the best example of "nationalizing" nationalism. During its twenty-five year old 
existence the language question – in addition to historical approach and ethnical identity 
– has belonged to the unclosed questions of personal and group identity, and represents 
one of the central themes of political struggle. Official Ukrainian language policy perma-
nently wants to promote the use of Ukrainian or Russian by overshadowing one or the oth-
er. Measures regulating language use have never been consequently applied, which fact in 
itself is enough to represent a permanent subject for political campaigns. Political powers 
unable to solve actual economic and social problems wanted to distract attention by this 
means. That is why the politicized language question could contribute to the political crisis 
and the outbreak of the armed conflict at the end of 2013 and at the beginning of 2014 in 
a politically unstable country facing economic breakdown. The present paper examines the 
role of the language question in the Ukrainian crisis in the period of 2014–2016. 
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The word "crisis" is used to define situations, when the life (or functioning) of an individual, 
a community, a company or a state is threatened by a serious turmoil or difficult situation 
which decisively influences the present as well as the future.1 In the brief history of Ukraine 
which gained its independence 25 years ago in 1991, the country had to face numerous 
crises. Constitutional, political, economical, demographical crises are closely linked to the 
history of the state. At the turn of 2013–2014 such crisis evolved in Ukraine that it outgrew 
its borders. Ukraine lost control over more than 11 % of its area (The area of Ukraine is 
603,500 km2; the area of the Crimea is cca. 27 thousand km2 and armed conflict territory 
in the Donbass region is cca. 42 thousand km2.) The annexation of the Crimea, the eastern 
Ukrainian armed conflict endangers the balance of the world’s security policy, now the po-
litical and economic sanctions against Russia and the responding opposing sanctions are 
obstructing the growth of world economy.2 Some analysts do not only talk about different 
1 Online: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/crisis (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
2 MARIONI, Max: The cost of Russian sanctions on Western economies, in: BOW Group Research Paper: The Sa-
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crises in the case of Ukraine, but use an overall term: "Ukrainian crisis". Sakwa describes 
the events in spring 2014 as the amount of two enormous crises, according to him "a com-
mon European and a Ukrainian crisis has led to this destructive consequence".3 Thus the 
exact definition of the eastern Ukrainian armed conflict still has not happened yet the war 
is often euphemistically called "Ukrainian crisis" by the analysts.4
The ethno-linguistic composition and language orientation of the regions with various his-
toric backgrounds (e.g. Donbas, Crimea, Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia) greatly differed 
already before Ukraine’s independence. The initial euphoria, however, concealed these 
differences. Having become independent, Ukraine faced a major problem: "What will the 
new identity be based on?"
The particular characteristics of the geopolitical and geographical position of Ukraine, the 
variable political, historical, economic, cultural and social development of the regions of its 
territory inherited from the Soviet Union, the ethnic and linguistic composition of its pop-
ulation, and the fact that the representatives of the titular nations of all neighboring states 
are among its citizens all turn issues of language into matters of internal and foreign policy 
as well as of security policy in this country. The military conflict (hybrid war) currently un-
derway is also indicative of this. According to Grin language policy is a systematic, rational 
and scientific activity which aims at changing the linguistic environment in order to increase 
well-being.5 Taking into account this statement, one can be certain that Ukrainian language 
policy is doomed to failure. Following the demand set by Grin’s definition has proven to be 
very challenging task in the case of Ukraine.
Typology of the Crises
In its brief history Ukraine had to face numerous crises. Constitutional, political, economic, 
demographical crises are closely linked to the history of the state.
• Economic crisis. When the Soviet Union was near to collapse, it was obvious that – as 
for economic, military and demographic importance – Ukraine would be the second 
most significant successor state preceded only by Russia. However, besides Kyrgyzstan 
Ukraine is the only post-soviet country that has not reached its last GDP as a member 
of the Soviet Union yet. In 2009 Ukrainian GDP was still not more than 63.3 % of the 
GDP of 1990, the last full Soviet year.6 The Ukrainian conflict, that has now been lasting 
nctions on Russia, August 2015, 16−31.; online: http://data.worldbank.org/country/russian-federation?view=chart 
(Downloaded 22 April 2017).
3 See SAKWA, Richard: Frontline of Ukraine: Crisis is the Borderlands, I.B. Tauris 2014.
4 LARUELLE, Marlene:The Ukrainian Crisis and its Impact on Transforming Russian Nationalism Landscape, in: 
Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, WILCZEWSKA, Agnieszka P. – SAKWA, Ri-
chard (Eds.), E-IR Info 2015, 123–128.; RUTLAND, Peter: An Unnecessary War: The Geopolitical Roots of the 
Ukraine Crisis, in: E-International Relations, 2015, online: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/09/an-unnecessary-war-
the-geopolitical-roots-of-the-ukraine-crisis/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017); KISSINGER, Henry: To Settle the Uk-
raine Crisis, Start at The End, in: The Washington Post, 5 March 2014, online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-startat-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-
d34c451760b9_story.html (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
5 GRIN, François: Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
Palgrave Macmillan 2003, 30.
6 SHUL’GA, Nikolaj: Дрейф на обочину. Двадцать лет общественных изменений в Украине [Drejf na obočinu. Dva-
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for two years (due to the sanctions and opposing sanctions) is obstructing the 
economic growth that could be barely reconstructed after the 2008 economic crisis, 
not only in Ukraine but all over the world. Ukrainian GDP significantly reduced in 2014 
and 2015, the country lost 21 % of its industrial capacity.7
• Constitutional crisis. Through 5 years until 1996 the country functioned based on the 
scant constitution of Soviet-Ukraine, and the Constitution that was accepted after 
numerous political struggles has been rewritten several times since then. Up to 2014 
the most important modifications reflected the polemics on presidential power. After 
the second Maidan one of the basic promises of the new ruling power was decentral- 
ization – this way trying to solve the Donbass conflict as well.8 Up to now three 
international documents were signed to solve the situation: the Minsk 19 and the Minsk 
Memorandum10 in 2014, and the Minsk 2 Agreement in 2015.11 The most important 
issue of the Minsk 2 Agreement was the "constitutional reform" to be performed by 
the end of 2015, granting decentralization, the representatives of the Donbass sepa- 
ratists should be involved. The draft on the issue of decentralization was made ready, 
but on August 31, 2015 the crowd protesting against its acceptance in front of the 
parliament began rioting, which forced the parliament to adjourn the modification of 
the law without date.12
• Political crises. The poor economic state, constitutional problems were the reasons 
and also consequences of internal political crises. The best verification of these crises 
is the fact that during the 25-year existence of the state, it had to face the emptying 
of the institution of the referendum, several early elections (head of state in 1994 and 
in 2014, parliamentary elections in 1994, 2007 and 2014), and two revolutions (the 
Orange revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014).13
• Demographic crisis. During the 1989 census (still as a member of the Soviet Union) 
the population of the Ukrainian SSR was 51.45 million people. The highest number 
was 52.2 million inhabitants in 1993. During the 2001 census which was the first but 
also the last census of the independent Ukraine this number decreased to 48.24 million, 
in 2013 it was about 45 million, while in early 2016 the officially estimated number 
dcat‘ let obščestvennych izmeněnij v Ukraině], Kiev 2011, 441.
7 Online: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp (Dowloaded 22 April 2017).
8 MARLIN, Marguerite: Concepts of "Decentralization" and "Federalization" in Ukraine: Political Signifiers or 
Distinct Constitutionalist Approaches for Devolutionary Federalism?, in: Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 22, 2016, 
3, 278–299.
9 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014, 
online: http://www.osce.org/home/123257 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
10 Memorandum of 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments 
of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, online: http://www.osce.org/home/123806 (Downloaded 22 April 
2017).
11 UN Security Council resolution 2202 (2015), 12 February 2015, online: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/ %7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9 %7D/s_res_2202.pdf (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
12 ASH, Timothy: Ukraine’s constitutional reform conundrum, in: KyivPost, 25 January 2016, online: https://www.
kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/timothy-ash-ukraines-constitutional-reform-conundrum-406630.html (Down-
loaded 22 April 2017).
13 See Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilisation, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine, D’ANIERI, Paul (Ed.), 
2011; MARPLES, David R: Ukraine in Conflict. An Analytical Chronicle, Bristol 2017.
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was a bit above 42 million (Crimean and eastern regions included).14 The annexed 
Crimea inhabited by 2.3 million people, and approximately 5 million individuals have 
been directly affected by the conflict in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). 
Nearly 2 million people left the Donbass region, about half of them chose other 
Ukrainian regions, the others immigrated to other countries.15 In 2012 1.4 million 
Ukrainian citizens were living permanently or temporarily in Russia, out of them 
1.3 million were employed, which meant 11 % of all employed foreigners. From 
April 2014 up to March 2015 another 2.5 million newcomers increased their number.16 
With consideration to the war, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece and Hungary have 
been assisting their linguistic minorities in relocating. In 2010, long before the eastern 
Ukrainian armed conflict, according to UN estimates the population of the country will 
decrease to 35.02 million people.17
• Humanitarian crisis. The armed conflict which broke out in 2014 required thousands 
of lives, many thousands were injured, hundreds of thousands lost their job, their 
house, asset, and were forced to leave their homes and move abroad or to another re- 
gion as refugees. The category of the so called Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
became introduced in Ukraine – due to people forced to relocate from the Crimea and 
the eastern war zone and "inland refugees". In March 2016 the Ministry of Social 
Policy of Ukraine recorded cca. 1.8 million IDP-s.18
Nation and Language
Kulyk sees the language an important marker of Ukrainian identity which, due to a lack of 
independent statehood, has been ethnic rather than civic. The contradictory policies of the 
Soviet regime produced a large discrepancy between ethnocultural identity and language 
use. In the independent Ukraine this discrepancy persisted, as increased identification with 
the Ukrainian nation was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the use of the 
Ukrainian language.19
One of the basic objectives of the emerging pursuit of independence in the Soviet Empire 
was to make the national languages – giving the names of the republics – state languag-
es. In 1988–1990 the supreme councils (parliaments) of the federal republics passed their 
language laws, which legally decided their national languages as state languages. Lan-
14 State Statistics Service of Ukraine, online: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
15 Понад два мільйони людей втекли з Донбасу за рік – ООН [Ponad dva mil‘joni ljuděj vtěkli z Donbasu za rik – 
OON], 3 May 2015, online: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/26969151.html (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
16 WEIR, Fred: Ukrainian refugees in Russia: Did Moscow fumble a valuable resource?, in: The Christian Science 
Monitor, 1 December 2015, online: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1201/Ukrainian-refugees-in-Rus-
sia-Did-Moscow-fumble-a-valuable-resource (Dowloaded 22 April 2017).
17 CSETE, Örs – PAPP Z., Attila – SETÉNYI, János: Kárpát-medencei magyar oktatás az ezredfordulón, in: Hatá-
ron túli magyarság a 21. században, BITSKEY, Botond (Ed.), Budapest 2010, 126–127.
18 Ukrinform: Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy reports nearly 1.8 million internally displaced persons, 31 May 
2016, online: https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/ukrinform-ukraines-ministry-of-social-po-
licy-reports-nearly-18-million-internally-displaced-persons-415034.html (Dowloaded 22 April 2017).
19 KULYK, Volodymyr: Language and identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan, in: Thesis Eleven, 136, 2016, 1, 90–
106.
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guage laws were soon followed by declarations of independence. This way the question 
of language got the focus of struggle for political independence and national identity.20 In 
Ukraine bearing the features of both bilingualism and multilingualism the struggle has still 
been fierce in the recent twenty-five years. 
In Ukraine the number of persons considering themselves Ukrainian nationals (nearly 78 %) 
is much higher than those who consider the Ukrainian state language their mother tongue/
first language (less than 68 %). The number of citizens considering Russian as their mother 
tongue/first language (nearly 30 %) is much higher than those who consider themselves 
Russian nationals (17.3 %). Nearly quarter (22.18 %) of the total population consider them-
selves belonging to national minorities. However, practically every third person (32.47 %) 
belongs to one or another linguistic minority from a linguistic point of view, as Ukrainian 
and Russian speakers represent 97.12 % of the total Ukrainian population. National minori-
ties preserving their mother tongues – Bulgarians, Rumanians, Moldovans, Hungarians and 
the Gagauz – live mainly in blocks, usually in peripheral regions of Ukraine (Transcarpathia, 
Northern Bukovina, Southern Bessarabia), which were joined to the Soviet Union due to 
border changes following the second world war. There are altogether four languages – 
Russian, Crimean Tatar, Rumanian and Hungarian – whose speakers represent more than 
10 % of the population of the given region.21
Similar to several other soviet republics, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Social-
ist Republic passed the law on the languages of the Ukrainian SSR – one of the first laws 
pursuing independence – as early as in October 1989.22 According to this law Ukrainian is 
the state language (2nd Article), Ukrainian and Russian are the languages for international 
communication (4th Article), and the use of minority languages is free choice at offices and 
in education (3rd, 10th, 11th, 12th, 18th, 19th, 27th, 28th, 29th Articles). 
However, negative trends concerning language politics could be seen soon after the suc-
cessful independence referendum (December 1, 1991) and the international recognition 
of Ukraine as an independent state. Concerning linguistic rights, the 1992 law on national 
minorities23 strengthened the already existing rights to mother tongue education, at the 
same time the possibility of official language use still depended on the majority of the giv-
en national minority inside the given administrative unit (8th Article). 
The acceptance of The Ukrainian Constitution in June 1996 did not brought essential 
changes concerning the codification of linguistic rights – except for the limitation of the 
20 JAVORSKAJA, Galyna: Языковые конфликты и языковые идеологии в Молдове (на материале анализа фо-
кус-групп) [Jazykovye konflikty i jazykovye iděologii v Moldove (na matěriale analiza fokus-grupp)], in: Studia 
Linguistika, 2011, 5, 350–351.
21 Online: http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017); CSERNICS-
KÓ, István – FERENC, Viktória: Transitions in the language policy of Ukraine (1989–2014), in: Sociolinguistic 
Transition in Former Eastern Bloc Countries: Two Decades after the Regime Change, SLOBODA Marian – LAIHO-
NEN, Petteri – ZABRODSKAJA, Anastassia (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main 2016, 350–353.
22 Закон Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки «Про мови в Українській РСР», № 8312-ХІ, від 28.10.1989 
[Zakon Ukrayins‘koyi Radjans‘koyi Socialističnoyi Respubliki «Pro movi v Ukrayins‘kij RSR», № 8312-ChI, vid 
28.10.1989], online: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/8312-11 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
23 Закон України «Про національні меншини в Україні», № 2494-ХІІ, від 25.06.1992 [Zakon Ukrayini «Pro nacional‘ni 
menšini v Ukrayini», № 2494-ChII, vid 25.06.1992], online: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2494-12 (Down-
loaded 22 April 2017).
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possibilities of Russian: it was no longer defined as the language of international commu-
nication – Russian became not more than one of the national minority languages. Those 
struggling for exclusive Ukrainian monolingualism considered it their victory, while those 
fighting for the acceptance of Russian as the second official language or a nationally ac-
cepted auxiliary language considered it was their defeat.
Ukraine joined the Council of Europe in 1996, but it did not bring about changes concern-
ing the use of mother tongue. The process of the Ukrainian ratification of The European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was complicated, the obligations of the stan-
dard text prescribe less than language rights already existing in Ukraine, do not support 
national minorities willing to preserve their existing positions, while their rights may be 
curtailed with reference to the Charter.24
After the millennium several laws and other lower rank measures were passed which had 
negative influence on non-state-language speakers. The 2001 year amendment of the law 
on parliamentary elections did no longer include the possibility of making ballots available 
in minority languages. In this period language use regulations were generally amended 
in favour of the Ukrainian language in several fields. Previously the prescriptions defining 
the language of the creation, announcement, application etc. of the documents of the 
different measures (concerning tax, finance, insurance, medicine, elections, food quality, 
etc.) fell within the competence of the language law, after 2000 each legal rule ordained 
the exclusive use of the state language. This trend became even stronger after the Orange 
revolution. Some examples of linguistic equality and inequality from the period: extra duty 
was imposed on non-Ukrainian publications; from 2008 only Ukrainian language broadcast-
ers could apply for the operation of radio and TV channels; cinemas were allowed to show 
only Ukrainian-speaking, synchronized or subtitled films.
Education reform should also be mentioned here, as the possibilities of mother-tongue 
education became limited. Advanced maturity exams – which meant the entrance exam-
inations to higher education as well – had to be taken at independent regional examination 
centres, in test-system and only in Ukrainian. In addition the Ukrainian language and litera-
ture exam became compulsory, the questions of the tests were compiled according to the 
education program of Ukrainian language schools.25
The politically prejudicial situation of minorities was changed by the new language law – 
"On the principles of the state language policy" – passed in 2012.26 The 2012 language 
law broke off with the declarative framework regulation – traditional in post-soviet regions. 
Following the spirituality and text of the Language Charter it defined exact rules and cri-
24 ALEKSEEV, Vladimir: Бегом от Европы? Кто и как противодействует в Украине реализации Европейской хартии 
региональных языков или языков меньшинств [Begom ot Jevropy? Kto i kak protivodějstvujet v Ukraině realizacii 
Jevropejskoj chartii regional›nych jazykov ili jazykov men›šinstv], Charkov 2008; CSERNICSKÓ, István: The Europe-
an Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by Ukraine, in: Acta Academiae Beregsasiensis, 2013, 2, 127–145. 
25 CSERNICSKÓ, István – FERENC, Viktória: Education as an ideal means of achieveing a nation state in Ukraine, 
in: Concepts & Consequences of Multilingualism in Europe, RÓKA, Jolán (Ed.), Budapest 2010, 329–349.
26 Закон України «Про засади державної мовної політики», № 5029-VI, від 03.07.2012 [Zakon Ukrayini «Pro zasadi 
děržavnoyi movnoyi politiki», № 5029-VI, vid 03.07.2012], online: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17 
(Downloaded 22 April 2017); CSERNICSKÓ, István: Language Policy in Ukraine: The Burdens of the Past and the 
Possibilities of the Future, in: Future Research Directions for Applied Linguistics, PFENNINGER, Simone E. – NAV-
RACSICS, Judit (Eds.), Bristol 2017, 120–148.
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teria for the addressees of the rights, the concerned geographical areas, the conditions 
of the use and mechanism of the standard rules and the duties of the executive powers. 
The law contains among others the exact and clear definition of the language of nation-
al minorities (1st article) and the list of (altogether 18) languages considered regional or 
minority languages in Ukraine – including Rusyn, which is officially not recognized as an 
independent language. The listed languages are: Russian, Belarussian, Bulgarian, Arme-
nian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldovian, German, Modern Greek, Polish, Roma, 
Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Rusyn, Karaim, Krymchak. According to the law the use of 
the above regional languages is compulsory or possible in case the number of the speakers 
of the given language is at least 10 % of the inhabitants in the given administrative unit (7th 
article, 3rd §).27
Expert opinions protesting against the 2012 language law fear the "Byelorussian way." 
In the neighbouring country (Byelorussia) actually less than 5 % of the population use the 
Byelorussian language, which threatens not only the language but also the existence of 
the Byelorussian nation. "Mother-tongueness" and "language use" should be differenti-
ated, in this respect the European Language Charter – when protecting Russian in Ukraine 
– supports a language used also by persons identifying themselves as Ukrainian – a great 
number of these people exclusively use Russian. This situation threatens the Ukrainian lan-
guage and the existence of the Ukrainian nation. The threat is strengthened by the fact that 
the law was introduced by representatives of Russian cultural circles.28 Positioning regional 
languages makes it unnecessary to learn Ukrainian, which is even more possible as a great 
number of the population do not speak the state language, and the situation is not likely 
to change under these conditions. We can see the hardly implicite "inverse" standpoint 
according to which minority languages threaten the state language unless it can perform 
its basic function.29
Language as a Casus Belli
In the late autumn of 2013 – before and after series of political and economic crises – riots 
broke out in Kyiv that claimed several lives, in March 2014 Russia annexed the Crimea, and 
the war which is officially called "antiterrorist operation" (ATO) has been lasting since April 
2014 at the eastern edges of the country. The Ukrainian-Russian position battle and the 
unsettled language policy plays a key role in the obstruction of the economic growth of the 
narrower and wider area, threatening the safety of the whole European continent.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union millions of the members of the Russian com-
27 CSERNICSKÓ, István – FEDINEC, Csilla: Four Language Laws of Ukraine, in: International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights, 23, 2016, 4, 560–582.
28 MOSER, Michael: За теперішніх обставин офіційна «одномовність», як не парадоксально, є важливою 
передумовою для фактичної багатомовності країни, 14 червня 2012 [Za těperišnich obstavin oficijna «odnomov-
nist’», jak ně paradoksal’no, e važlivoju peredumovoju dlja faktičnoyi bagatomovnosti krayini, 14 červnja 2012], 
online: http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/ukrayinska-mova/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
29 VOROPAJEVA, Tetjana: Мова, ідентичність і толерантність в контексті імплементації Європейської Хартії 
регіональних мов або мов меншин в Україні [Mova, iděntičnist’ i tolerantnist’ v kontěksti implementaciyi Ev-
ropejs’koyi Chartiyi regional’nich mov abo mov menšin v Ukrayini], in: Українознавчий альманах [Ukrayinoznavčij 
al'manach], 9, 2012, 28–36.
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munity in Ukraine have suddenly become a minority, de jure subordinate, that earlier in 
the Soviet empire linguistically and culturally belonged to the privileged group.30 But de 
facto, these positive economic, political and cultural positions could be saved after the 
state change.31 In this already problematic, tense political situation the fact that the new 
state organizing ethnic group (Ukrainian) claimed all the treasured positions of the Russian 
community is the main cause of the conflict.
The conflict between the two dominant ethnic groups broke out because of the functions 
of the Ukrainian and Russian language. As a result, a paradoxical situation has risen in 
the language situation and the judgement of the state language policy of the minorities 
(amongst them the loudest are Russian-speaking) are dissatisfied with their guaranteed 
language rights, while the majority of the elite is worried  about the current status and 
future of the Ukrainian language.32 Korostelina sees the struggle between languages and 
identities as a zero-sum game that makes compromise impossible.33
The political elite divided into two parts used the mobilizing force of the language in 
all of the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns in the history of indepen-
dent Ukraine. In the country’s northern and western parts the population (where mainly 
Ukrainian-speaking people live) were threatened by the politicians, that if Russian becomes 
a second state language in Ukraine it would seal the fate of an independent Ukraine and 
the Ukrainian nation. A significantly Russian-speaking population of the eastern and south-
ern regions, in contrast tried to encourage voters that the status of their language, the 
Russian will be regularized and that it will not be superseded from everyday life by the 
ukrainizing political elite.
The activity around the language issue especially increased as the 2012 parliamentary elec-
tions were approaching. In 2010, only 2.43 %, and in 2011 less than 1.80 % of the political 
movements were related to the language situation, in 2012 this proportion rose to 10.45 
%.34
An indicator of how interested are the politicians in keeping the language problem in the 
agenda is that in 2011 (when there were no elections in Ukraine) in 46 % of the movements 
affecting the language issue were involved parties or other political actors; in the two elec-
tion years (2010 and 2012), however, this ratio was 64 % and 66 %.35 In 2012, 92 % of the 
380 political movements related to the language issue were in defense of the Ukrainian 
language, against raising the status of Russian language.36
The main cause of the language-issue-related demonstrations was the adoption of the new 
30 See HAGENDOORN, Louk – LINSSEN, Hub – TUMANOV, Sergei: Intergroup Relations in States of the former 
Soviet Union: The Perception of Russians, New York 2001.
31 BRUBAKER, Rogers: Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 
Cambridge 1996, 17.
32 BOWRING, Bill: The Russian Language in Ukraine: Complicit in Genocide, or Victim of State-building?, in: 
The Russian Language Outside the Nation, RYAZANOVA-CLARCE, Lara (Ed.), Edingurgh 2014, 56–78.; KULYK 
Volodymyr: What is Russian in Ukraine? Pupular Beliefs Regarding the Social Roles of the Language, in: The Rus-
sian Language, 117–140.
33 KOROSTELINA, Karina V.: Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine, in: Nationalities Papers, 41, 2013, 
2, 313.
34 Протести, перемоги і репресії в Україні: результати моніторингу 2012 р. [Protěsti, peremogi i represiyi v Ukrayini: 
rezul‘tati monitoringu 2012 r.], IŠČENKO, Volodimir (Ed.), Kiev 2013, 34.
35 Ibidem, 36.
36 Ibidem, 34.
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Language Act. After being defeated in the 2004 Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych 
won the 2010 presidential election, the President and the Party of Regions behind him – 
according to election promises – he intended to base language policy on the real situation. 
They wanted to codify the country’s de facto bilingualism by raising Russian into a sec-
ond state language status. The central part of their argument was that violent nationalism 
threatens linguistic and ethnic rights of the Russian-speaking population, it overshadows 
the Russian language and culture.37 However, the right of free use of the Russian language 
was demanded not only in the southern and eastern regions, but also across the country, 
also in areas where the proportion of the Russian-speaking population is insignificant. The 
new power – ignoring the protest actions – began to rewrite the Constitution and the Lan-
guage Act. They did not have the political power for the amendment of the Constitution: 
they did not get two-thirds of the votes in the Parliament. However, the 1989 language law 
from the Soviet times in 2012 has been replaced after scandalous and unworthy parliamen-
tary scenes and political games.38
The language law had a number of opponents. The Constitutional Court was repeatedly 
asked to declare it unconstitutional, organizing several protests in the streets. The lan-
guage issue was not reassuring. On 21 November 2013, it became apparent that the pres-
ident of Ukraine – a country heading towards state bankruptcy at the time – was not going 
to sign the free trade agreement or the association agreement with the European Union in 
Vilnius. The Ukrainian government opted for the very favourable Russian loan rather than 
the IMF loan, which would have brought unpopular and strict austerity measures threaten-
ing its power.
On 23 November protests for Ukraine’s European integration started in Kyiv.39 The pro-
tests organized in the city’s main square40 were peaceful for a while and were called the 
Revolution of Dignity. On November 30 an unreasonably brutal use of force by the police 
propelled the lukewarm protests into a national movement. The parliamentary majority 
backing the president modified several laws on 16 January 2014, in order to limit people’s 
right of assembly. This triggered the protests to escalate to uncontrolled violence which 
resulted in many casualties (are remembered as "Heaven’s Hundred Heroes") as well. The 
parliament repealed the laws of January 16 on January 28,41 and on February 22 president 
Yanukovych fled the country.
A quick realignment occurred in the parliament. Representing different parties than be-
fore, the same members of parliament formed a parliamentary majority which repealed the 
language law on 23 February 2014.42 Russia immediately announced that it would defend 
37 BOWRING, Bill: The Russian Language, 56–78.
38 See MOSER, Michael: Language Policy.
39 ONUCH, Olga: EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks, in: Problems of Post-Com-
munism, 62, 2015, 1–19.
40 Kyiv’s central square is called майдан Незалежності (Independence Square) in Ukrainian, however, the locals 
usually refer to it as Майдан (Square), and it was called Maidan in news broadcasts, which, in turn, gave rise to the 
most often used name of the movement as Euromaidan/Євромайдан.
41 Закон України «Про визнання такими, що втратили чинність, деяких законів України», №732-VII, від 28.01.2014 
[Zakon Ukrayini «Pro viznannja takimi, ščo vtratili činnist’, dějakich zakoniv Ukrayini», №732-VII, vid 28.01.2014], 
online: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/732-18 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
42 Ukraine abolishes law on languages of minorities, including Russian, 23 February 2014, online: http://rbth.
co.uk/news/2014/02/23/ukraine_abolishes_law_on_languages_of_minorities_including_russian_34486.html. The 
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the Russian speaking minority of Ukraine and protect it from Ukrainian nationalism. On the 
territory of Crimea, which was transferred in 1954 as the Crimean Autonomous Republic 
from the Russian Federation to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, military personnel 
from the Russian army ("little green men") bearing no insignia of their affiliation appeared 
on the same day.43
Russian President Vladimir Putin said the following in his speech during the ceremony 
regarding the annexation of the Crimea on 18 March 2014, where he called it "mainly Rus-
sian-speaking Crimea": "the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help 
in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are 
still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities. Naturally, we could not 
leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This 
would have been betrayal on our part. […] Our concerns are understandable because we 
are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. 
[…] Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to 
do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. 
But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that these people’s rights and 
interests are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial 
integrity".44
Two and a half years after the beginning of the events of Donbass and the Crimea, the 
Russian president stated his opinion that due to steps taken by the Ukrainian power, Rus-
sia "was forced to defend Russian-speaking population of Donbass".45 Russia was not the 
only one that welcomed the abolition of the law with suspect. The Special Rapporteur of 
UN Stated: "Steps to Abolish the 2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy, 
although veto, created anxiety amongst some communities, Including ethnic Russians, will 
hurt minority language rights in fortress."46
Temporarily filling the positions of both president and speaker of the parliament, Oleksan-
dr Turchynov assessed the situation and decided, on 27 February not to sign the document 
that would have repealed the language law of 2012, which thus remained in force. It was 
too late for a decision, and the attempt of the abolition of the 2012 language law become 
the pretext of the newest and most serious crisis in Ukraine.
The attempt of the abolition of the language law – when a few hundred meters away from 
the representatives voting on this in parliament, thousands protested, gunman looked at 
text of law, online: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=45291 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
43 FEDINEC, Csilla – HALÁSZ, Iván – TÓTH, Mihály: A független Ukrajna: Államépítés, alkotmányozás és elsüly-
lyesztett kincsek, Budapest 2016, 105–108.
44 Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, online: Address by President of the Russian 
FederationAddress by President of the Russian FederationAddress by President of the Russian FederationAddress 
by President of the Russian Federationhttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 (Downloaded 22 April 
2017)
45 Путин: Вынудили защищать русскоязычных на Донбассе [Putin: Vynudili zaščiščat› russkojazyčnych na Donbasse], 
in: Korrespondent.net, 12, October 2016, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3756878-putyn-vynu-
dyly-zaschyschat-russkoiazychnykh-na-donbasse (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
46 Ukraine: UN Special Rapporteur urges stronger minority rights guarantees to defuse tensions. Geneva, 16 
April 2014, online: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14520 (Downlo-
aded 22 April 2017).
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each other eye to eye, burned in fires – demonstrates how important and symbolic is the 
language issue in Ukraine.
There are differences in literature concerning the question. According to Sakwa "the lan-
guage issue was one of the main causes of the conflict that erupted in the eastern part of 
the country".47 Drozda sees: "The present situation in Ukraine is an example of how can a 
linguistic and cultural war become a precondition and official principle of a real war."48 At 
the same time Osnach states: "Wherever we look, the current Russian-Ukrainian war began 
because of the language. It is an indisputable fact. Russia has just used the language factor 
as a reason for aggression – by explaining that they need to protect the Russian-speaking 
citizens of Ukraine."49
The Language Policy and the Recent Crisis
Instead of suddenly abolishing the language law Turchynov made a proposal to develop a 
new language law. He stated that the draft of the new law to be completed within a short 
period of time, "taking into account the existing speculations regarding the language is-
sue". Turchynov also added that the new, balanced Language Act "will take into account 
the eastern and western parts of Ukraine, the interests of all ethnic groups and national mi-
norities".50 The new language law has still not been born, but this step served to ease the 
tension, as the statement that prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk and Turchynov pledged on 
18 April 2014, that the highly centralized state power will be decentralized and Russian will 
get a special status.51 The parliament on 20 May voted the "Memorandum of Understand-
ing and Peace", in relation to the languages in which says: "In parallel with the status of the 
Ukrainian language as a state language the Supreme Council of Ukraine guarantees the in-
surance of the status of Russian language. The government will also guarantee the support 
for the languages of national minorities in minority areas compactly."52 However, this came 
too late. In April 2014 the recent domestic political developments overshadowed the case 
of the new language law. With the support of the Russian army an armed conflict broke out 
in East-Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk counties. The euphemistically called "anti-terrorist 
47 SAKWA, Frontline of Ukraine, 220.
48 DROZDA, Andrij: Розрубати мовний вузол. Скільки російськомовних українців готові наполягати на 
російськомовності своїх дітей і внуків? [Rozrubati movnij vuzol. Skil›ki rosijs›komovnich ukrayinciv gotovi 
napoljagati na rosijs›komovnosti svoyich ditěj i vnukiv?], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 23 
November 2014, online: http://language-policy.info/2014/11/rozrubaty-movnyj-vuzol-skilky-rosijskomovnyh-uk-
rajintsiv-hotovi-napolyahaty-na-rosijskomovnosti-svojih-ditej-i-vnukiv/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
49 OSNACH, Sergij: Мовна складова гібридної війни [Movna skladova gibridnoyi vijni], in: Портал мовної 
політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 13 June 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/serhij-osnach-
movna-skladova-hibrydnoji-vijny/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
50 Голова Верховної Ради України Олександр Турчинов доручив підготувати новий Закон України «Про мову» [Golova 
Verchovnoyi Radi Ukrayini Oleksandr Turčinov doručiv pidgotuvati novij Zakon Ukrayini «Pro movu»], 27 February 
2014, online: http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/Povidomlennya/88685.html (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
51 MARUSYK, Taras: Чиїми «молитвами» закон Колесніченка–Ківалова живе й перемагає [Čiyimi «molitvami» za-
kon Kolesničenka–Kivalova žive j peremagae], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 16 June 2015, 
online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/taras-marusyk-chyjimy-molytvamy-zakon-kolesnichenka-kivalova-
zhyve-j-peremahaje/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
52 Ibidem.
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operation" – besides the country’s extremely serious economic situation and unbalanced 
domestic politic – led to a severe crisis.
The new president continued a conciliatory approach. On 28 June 2014 Petro Poroshenko 
expressed his hope: "I hope – Poroshenko said in a statement on 28 June 2014 – that in 
the history of Ukraine the issue of language or culture will never again threaten the nation-
al unity", thereby acknowledging that the unsettled language problem is a security risk 
for the state. Poroshenko in his post-election speech and in his New Year’s made speech 
gestures towards the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. At one point in his speech he 
switched to Russian. He also stated that one can love Ukraine in Russian as much as in 
Ukrainian. He added that 62 % who fought for Ukraine in the east is Russian-speaking.53 
The President was the supporter of a movement, which tried to reduce the tension in the 
country: the "Єдина країна – Единая страна" ("the single country" in Ukrainian and Russian) 
slogan was depicted on posters, billboards, leaflets, on national television, in the corner of 
video clips, it also has a dedicated page on the most popular social network site.54
This gives reason for nationalist intellectual circles to keep attacking the president.55 One 
of the best known Kyiv based linguistics, Larysa Masenko stated the following in an inter-
net portal where language related issues are discussed regularly: "The currently popular 
slogan ‘Єдина країна – Единая страна’ is faulty: it solidifies bilingualism on a country level, 
that is, it strengthens Russian as a second state language. In other words, it does not unify 
the country but divides it. By saying ‘Единая страна’ in Russian we turn to those living in 
the east and assert that Ukrainian, which is a special symbol of the unification of the na-
tion, is not obligatory, even for the president, and with this we betray Ukrainians, primarily 
those living in the east, who are loyal to their language despite the constant pressure from 
the Russian speaking environment."56 Shevchuk, a linguist teaching Ukrainian in the Unit-
ed States agrees: "The Ukrainian society has not only become a hostage" to the united 
and indivisible Russia’s "imperial formula ‘Єдина країна, Единая страна’ which onfirms the 
Russification. With its resignation and conformism they take part in destroying their own 
53 Решение о лишении русского языка статуса регионального было ошибкой – Порошенко [Rešenije o lišenii 
russkogo jazyka statusa regional‘nogo bylo ošibkoj – Porošenko], in: Korrespondent.net, 28, June 2014, online: 
http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3385352-reshenye-o-lyshenyy-russkoho-yazyka-statusa-rehyonalno-
ho-bylo-oshybkoi-Porosenko (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
54 Єдина Країна | Единая Страна [Edina Krayina | Jedinaja Strana], online: https://vk.com/edina_ukr (Downloaded 
22 April 2017).
55 OSNACH, Мовна складова [Movna skladova]; SHEVCHUK, Yuri – OLIYNYK, Yevhenia: Російськомовними 
патріотами маніпулюють – викладач Колумбійського університету [Rosijs’komovnimi patriotami manipuljujut’ – vik-
ladač Kolumbijs’kogo universitětu], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 20 June 2015, online: 
http://language-policy.info/2015/06/rosijskomovnymy-patriotamy-manipulyuyut-vykladach-kolumbijskoho-
universytetu/; MASENKO, Larysa – HOROBETS, Olena: Офіційна двомовність не об’єднує країну, а сприяє її розпаду 
[Oficijna dvomovnist› ně ob’ednue krayinu, a sprijae yiyi rozpadu], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi 
politiki], 20 June 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/larysa-masenko-ofitsijna-dvomovnist-ne-ob-
jednuje-krajinu-a-spryyaje-jiji-rozpadu/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
56 MASENKO, Larysa – OREL, Maya: Нам потрібен мовний кордон із Росією. Сучасна мовна політика в 
Україні очима соціолінгвіста [Nam potriben movnij kordon iz Rosieju. Sučasna movna politika v Ukrayini očima 
sociolingvista], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 26 December 2014, online: http://language-
policy.info/2014/12/nam-potriben-movnyj-kordon-iz-rosijeyu-suchasna-movna-polityka-ukrajini-ochyma-
sotsiolinhvista/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
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language and culture".57 Citing a metaphorical parallel between the inhabitants of Gilead 
and Ephraim of the biblical Book of Judges (112: 56), known for bloody conflicts (see now 
Shibboleth) and between the Ukrainian war, Shevchuk opposed the Ukrainian-Russian bi-
lingualism for all kinds of manifestations: "The linguistic schizophrenia deprives the protec-
tive role from the Ukrainian language in the existential situations when your life is in danger, 
and based on your language you can distinguish ours from the enemy."58
Masenko is suspiciously eyeing the Russian-speaking part of the Ukrainian society: "The 
victory in the linguistic and cultural war with Ukraine was a prerequisite for Russia in the 
current military intervention, and the occupation of Donbass and the Crimea. And plan-
ning the revitalization of the Soviet empire, the Kremlin is counting on those parts of the 
Ukrainian population which could be ‘crystallized’ by the control of the mass media."59 
Many consider that the sacrifice made by Russian native speakers on the front line for 
Ukraine is not enough. A Ukrainian writer Matsyuk explains in one of the entries in a lan-
guage policy portal on Russian-speaking people fighting against separatists "somehow 
we should make them believe, that their Moscow language is their personal sin against 
Ukraine [...] against the Ukraine, for which, literally, they shed their blood". According to 
him, the Russian-speaking Ukrainians also have to be convinced that the Russian language 
in Ukraine does not worth the blood sacrifice. And then he asks the question: [the Rus-
sian-speaking Ukrainians] "when will they leave the Russian speech which has only been 
their mother tongue since the second generation? This will be the redemption of their 
original sin, which is more expensive for Ukraine than their blood".60
The battlefield sacrifice of the Russian-speaking is being reduced by sociological research. 
For example, a survey published 6 June 2016, points out that among the participants of 
the ATO 73 % is of Ukrainian mother tongue, 6 % of Russian and 19 % of the Ukrainian-Rus-
sian-speaking rate; however, among those informants who are not involved in the ATO, 
only 55 % is the proportion of native speakers of the Ukrainians, 19 % is Russian-speaking 
and 23 % is bilingual. So there is a bigger proportion of the Ukrainian-speakers in the ATO 
than amongst those who are not involved in the fights.61
Every year on 9 November the Ukrainian Literacy Day is celebrated. In 2015 on this occa-
sion a one and a half minute video was made where volunteers62 in eastern Ukraine who 
57 See SHEVCHUK, Yuri: Movna šizofrenija. Quo vadis, Ukrayino?, Ivano-Frankivs’k 2015.
58  SHEVCHUK, Yuri – PALAZHYI, Halyna: Мовна шизофренія – нова, потужна форма русифікації [Movna 
šizofrenija – nova, potužna forma rusifikaciyi], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 19 Septem-
ber 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/09/yurij-shevchuk-movna-shyzofreniya-nova-potuzhna-forma-
rusyfikatsiji/#more-1780 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
59 MASENKO, Larysa: Мовознавча солідарність по-українськи [Movoznavča solidarnist› po-ukrayins›ki], 
in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 24 September 2015, online: http://language-policy.
info/2015/09/larysa-masenko-movoznavcha-solidarnist-po-ukrajinsky/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
60 MATSYUK, Romko: Гріх [Grich], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 12 November 2015, 
online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/roman-matsyuk-hrih/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
61 Дослідження: українська мова є рідною для 73 % учасників АТО, російська – для 6 % [Doslidžennja: ukrayins‘ka 
mova e ridnoju dlja 73 % učasnikiv ATO, rosijs‘ka – dlja 6 %,], 7 June 2016, online: http://language-policy.
info/2016/06/doslidzhennya-ukrajinska-mova-je-ridnoyu-dlya-73-uchasnykiv-ato-rosijska-dlya-6/ (Downloaded 22 
April 2017).
62 As a result a hybrid war from 2014, the president Ukraine create volunteer units under the program "Territo-
rial Defense". In November 2014 most of the territorial battalions were integrated into Ukraine’s Ground forces.
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took part in battles, tell their ideas on Ukrainian politics. The words of the volunteers indi-
cate, how the Ukrainian national side sees the role of the Ukrainian and Russian language, 
objectives and tasks of the wartime language policy. The first interviewee said: "I grew 
up in a Russian-speaking family. After the Maidan I switched to the use of the Ukrainian 
language, because I realized that the best resistance against the Russian aggression is if 
we speak Ukrainian." Another volunteer stated: "enemies [...] openly claim that where the 
Russian language is, there is the Russian interest". Essence of the message: "If you do not 
want the Russian soldiers to come and ‘liberate’ you and your loved ones use the most 
powerful weapon against them: speak Ukrainian!"63
Civil movements are protesting against the missing Ukrainian nationalization. On the 9th 
of November 2015 a movement in front of the presidential office announced claims to 
provide special status of the Ukrainian language, the motto was "Ukrainization – resistance 
against the occupation".64 "The [...] language law was written on Putin’s knee, and had a 
different purpose. The president keeps talking about the protection of the Ukrainian lan-
guage, but nothing happens. We are tired of demagoguery. A war is going on here, the 
Russian propaganda pours from the screen, and no one does anything about it" – said one 
of the protesters.65
Extension of the scope of use of the Ukrainian language, the obstruction of the Russian 
language is considered by many as a split from the colonial past Soviet era and means 
freedom and independence. According to Masenko, "the Russian language is the chain 
that bounds Ukraine to the Communist past".66
At the 25th anniversary of the Ukrainian independence scheduled for 24 August 2016 a 
nationwide campaign of young people was announced, the slogan was: "Be truly indepen-
dent: speak Ukrainian!"67
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the crisis in Ukraine and the language problems are connected 
by multiple threads. In the only 25-year history, the country has faced various crises. In the 
63 Військові та волонтери закликають спілкуватися українською – відео [Vijs‘kovi ta volontěri zaklikajut‘ spil-
kuvatisja ukrayins‘koju – viděo], 9 November 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/vijskovi-ta-volont-
ery-zaklykayut-spilkuvatysya-ukrajinskoyu-video/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
64 Що можна зробити у День української писемності та мови [Ščo možna zrobiti u Děn‘ ukrayins‘koyi pisemnosti 
ta movi], 7 November 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/scho-mozhna-zrobyty-u-den-ukrajinsko-
ji-pysemnosti-ta-movy/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
65 На Банковій протестували проти русифікації [Na Bankovij protěstuvali proti rusifikaciyi], 9 November 2015, 
online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/na-bankovij-protestuvaly-proty-rusyfikatsiji/ (Downloaded 22 April 
2017).
66 MASENKO, Larysa: Скандал в Охматдиті як дзеркало пострадянської мовної політики [Skandal v Ochmatditi 
jak dzerkalo postradjans‘koyi movnoyi politiki], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], 29 August 
2016, online: http://language-policy.info/2016/08/skandal-v-ohmatdyti-yak-dzerkalo-postradyanskoji-movnoji-
polityky/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).
67 Мовомарафон-25: до річниці Незалежності українці переходитимуть на українську мову [Movomarafon-25: do 
ričnici Nězaležnosti ukrayinci perechoditimut‘ na ukrayins‘ku movu], 11 August 2016, online: http://language-po-
licy.info/2016/08/movomarafon-25-do-richnytsi-nezalezhnosti-ukrajintsi-perehodytymut-na-ukrajinsku-movu/ 
(Downloaded 22 April 2017).
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domestic political crises the language issue was constantly present: the political elite used 
the language issue as a mobilizing force for the election mood-enhancing factor to their 
own use. The language issue could become a division factor instead of a cohesion factor 
for a nation that is seeking identity after the collapse of the Soviet system.
As a result of the misguided language policy in the tense political situation the language 
issue became a pretext for military intervention, it has become a casus belli. In the conflict 
of the increased Russian nationalism and the growing Ukrainian nationalism the language 
plays a central role. In response to the circumstances of the Ukrainian crisis, the Kyiv gov-
ernment is trying to develop a language policy that reduces social division and tension 
and towards both sides (native speakers of Ukrainian and Russian speakers). However, the 
Ukrainian nationalism sees Russian language as the aggressor, as the enemy’s language 
and the spread of the Ukrainian language is connected to the country’s independence, 
winning the war in the east and the independence. Simultaneously, however, the imperial 
nationalism in Russia, apparently for state-supported shows on the Ukrainian nationalism 
as a response to the annexation of the Crimea and the military intervention into Ukrainian 
territory.
Ukraine today is a state that has been in a transitional period since the proclamation of its 
independence twenty-five years ago: it seeks the leaven, which can be the basis for a new 
national identity. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian language policy did not contribute to this 
search and could not come up with valid solutions for the crisis. However aftermath of the 
Crisis the currently bilingual country can become monolingual gradually.
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